Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
This literature review focuses on propaganda and psychological warfare and how these tactics have been used in war. At the beginning of the research process, I was drawn to the concept of propaganda and then as I progressed, psychological warfare became another topic in conjunction with the first. A focus also developed on the propaganda strategies specifically of World War Two which then turned into the Korean War. The following essays discuss the elements of propaganda and psychological warfare in the context of historical examples to examine warfare, how the strategies have changed, and how these tactics have been successfully implemented in combination with traditional combat.
"The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda" – Edward L. Bernays
This essay discusses how Germany, England, and the United States marketed their policies during World War One in an effort to make suggestions on how to successfully disseminate information regarding ideals and policies to the public in the future. Bernays believes that the best approach is one of scientific style and systematic in nature. To begin his argument, Bernays cites two works, the first, “Propaganda Technique in the World War” by Harold Lasswell, provides “six factors of propaganda.” The factors are as follows: (1) put the guilt of the war on the enemy, (2) “claim unity and victory in the names of history and deity,” (3) state the goals of war, such as security or a better social order, (4) make the people believe that the enemy is responsible for the war with evidence of the corruption, (5) make the people believe that negative news is really enemy lies, and (6) use horror stories to sound authoritative. The second work, “Allied Propaganda on the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918” by George Bruntz, lists five different types of propaganda: propaganda of enlightenment, propaganda of despair, propaganda of hope, particularist propaganda, and revolutionary propaganda. By breaking down what propaganda is, Bernays begins to focus on the purpose of propaganda and states that all propaganda, no matter what country, serves to increase morale on the home front, decrease the morale of the enemy, and win the morale of the neutral people.
The essay goes on to critique the propaganda and psychological warfare techniques of Germany, Great Britain, and America during World War One. Germany did not place value on influencing the morale on the home front and mainly focused on external techniques such as distributing leaflets and pamphlets to foreign countries. However, the propaganda distributed was overall poor and was thoughtless and too obvious. Britain on the other hand had control of trans-Atlantic cables and the radio, but still made use of planes to drop propaganda in enemy countries. The British propaganda was more successful than the German, one reason being that the British propaganda was organized by the citizens. Over in America, propaganda began because there became a need for it. The Committee on Public Information was founded in 1917 which worked without definite goals or a strategy to disseminate the information. Even with these limitations, the American propaganda proved to be effective. Bernays discusses what calls an “engineering approach” to propaganda and psychological warfare which calls for strategy, planning, and timing. This approach will allow all of the logistics behind propaganda, such as what the goal is, what symbols to use, how to communicate the messages, and how much money and materials would be necessary, to be carefully planned out. Bernays also suggested that a general staff of experts be formed for the purpose of psychological warfare so that when needed, the staff would speed the process of morale building and creating propaganda to strengthen America’s democracy.
“The Strategies of Psychological Warfare” – Leonard W. Doob
In this article, Doob suggests that strategies of psychological warfare can be catalogued and examined regardless of the many variables, making them “a little less artistic and a little more scientific.” The major goal of Doob is to identify the factors in psychological warfare and figuring out how these factors can be weighted to make a sort of psychological warfare equation. By isolating the variables of psychological warfare, planning strategies would be more concrete and would be recommended rather than just being selected.
The first variable that is examined is the response of the audience to the psychological warfare, which is broken down into three categories that act as independent variables: responses that were wanted, responses that already existed, and anticipated future responses. From these variables, Doob discusses possible routes that each variable creates, which eventually lead to assumptions about how successful the logistics of psychological warfare tactics are. These assumptions are organized into a chart and can be used to determine a strategy for psychological warfare. Another aspect of psychological warfare campaigns is the enemy. The tactics used are meant to weaken the enemy. Doob created a second chart to show ten randomly selected campaigns against the enemy and shows the foundations of the strategies. The chart makes the psychological warfare planner be more mindful of the variables related to the strategy.
“Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II” – Martin F. Herz
Herz discusses the leaflet and combat propaganda and their role in World War II. Though it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the materials because the audience is unavailable, general guidelines to create propaganda can be made. Herz says that the materials must be truthful, the person creating the propaganda must know how to address people who are unsure of either side’s messages within the enemy, the attack must be concentrated, domestic propaganda should not be exported, an area of agreement must be reached with the audience, and the creator must decide what strategies would be successful for both sides. In order to determine the effectiveness of the campaigns the following evidence was utilized: the number of leaflets found with the prisoners, the recollection of the leaflets the prisoners had and their comments about them, positive mentions, the descriptions of the surrenders by the prisoners, German counter-propaganda, and comments from the enemy command that were found from captured documents. Herz also introduces that combat propaganda must target “the marginal man” because he can be swayed and could be useful for peacetime propaganda. Finding common ground with the enemy using propaganda is important for the psychological manipulation of the enemy. “Black propaganda” or “gray propaganda,” propaganda, in which the source is not known, is a dangerous strategy because if the source is found out, then increased hatred occurs. Taking into account all of these aspects of propaganda, the success of the campaign can be more effective against the enemy.
“The Future of Psychological Warfare”- Hans Speier
Speier discusses multiple examples of warfare propaganda to use as evidence that more study and preparation are necessary for the United States to implement successful psychological warfare campaigns in the future. Speier also suggests that in order to be prepared, the U.S. must become realistic about political warfare and that more development and preparation of psychological warfare tactics must take place. In both World Wars, psychological warfare was unprepared and left up to people who had experience in advertising, news, and entertainment, and Speier notes that in the event of another war, this poor planning will not be as successful as it was in the past. The United States lacks an organization to plan for these strategies and there is no accurate study on how to measure the effectiveness of propaganda. Another factor that the U.S. lacks is that there is no peacetime planning for wartime propaganda. During war, the focus was placed on releasing the news of the week and there was not any planning beyond this task. In the future, Americans need to be protected and defensive measures need to be taken to keep their morale. Speier suggests that “the historical form of propaganda is a trait of the civilization in which it occurs,” which is seen in wartime propaganda as it relies on the amount of mass participation in war, the tension between the countries, and on the political systems and ideologies. One of the only times during war when morals are brought up is when psychological warfare is considered. Efforts to render the enemy vulnerable in unity and instill a feeling of defeatism are both important attributes of psychological warfare. The enemy is also defined as a “total enemy” who is impossible to settle a conflict with, so that when the all psychological warfare strategies can be used at the most opportune moment so that success is guaranteed.
Tactical propaganda and strategic propaganda are compared, noting that the difference is tactical can provide a reward, such as safety, and strategic can only provide increased combat and suffering. Strategic propaganda has the goal of subversion, action against one’s government. This propaganda must create motivation and inspire belief in ideas that are worth a sacrifice. Speier goes on to discuss “missionary subversion propaganda,” “Cynical subversion propaganda,” and “moralistic and judicious subversion propaganda,” all of which are similar but have slightly different strategies such as convincing the enemy that there is no hope or that it is their moral duty to act in a certain manner.
“Pamphlets Away: The Allied Propaganda Campaign Over Japan During the Last Months of World War II” – Ferenc Morton Szasz
The essay begins by discussing the many ways psychological operations were executed in World War II to raise morale in the home front and discourage the enemy. These tactics included pamphlets, films, leaflets, and booklets. In Germany, the fil Sieg im Westen celebrated the victories of the Nazis, America also made use of films, and Britain dropped leaflets. Leaflets were a main form of propaganda and were used for six years. The success of these leaflets, however, is disputed among historians. Some suggest in the case of Nazi propaganda that eventually it all blurred together while others say it formed another aspect of the war and that the Nazis “won” this aspect. Another aspect of the argument is that there has been little study on the impact of leaflets and therefore negating the rest of the arguments. Over in the Pacific, the psychological operations relied on mostly short-wave radio broadcasts and leaflets dropped from a plane. These leaflet missions were disliked by military personnel due to the high risk nature and for the purpose of just dropping paper. However, the attitude towards the missions later changed when the process was streamlined as a result of the “leaflet bomb” created by Army Air Corps Captain James Monroe.
The United States dropped millions of leaflets over Japan in efforts to warn civilians and attempt to persuade the Japanese troops to surrender and cease resistance. Surprisingly, about ten thousand Japanese soldiers took the offer of safe passage on the leaflets at Okinawa which led to the capture of the city. From this, the POWs were used to translate new leaflets and a portable printing press was set up. In response the the American propaganda attack, the Japanese government became strict with communication systems in an attempt to decrease American messages. In all of the leaflets released over Japan, none mentioned the possible threat of an atomic weapon. This was due to the secrecy of the project and a desire to create shock within the Japanese people with a surprise attack. However, before the attack, in an attempt to avoid excess deaths, the U.S. dropped leaflets warning of an air raid and told people to seek shelter. This strategy was groundbreaking as it was the first time in history that an enemy was told ahead of time when attack would occur. Historians note that while radio was important to change Japanese views, the leaflets that were dropped were more effective and held more weight with the people. This effectiveness stemmed from the sheer volume of leaflets dropped and the repeated messages of warnings to evacuate and to build a peaceful life after the war, these two elements gave the leaflets credibility that really affected the Japanese.
“Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War” – Deepa Kumar
Kumar discusses how the media-military industrial complex is used to make sure that pro-war messages are constantly in the public sphere. Due to media consolidation, the media acts in the interests of the prominent people of the political and economic spheres rather than in the interest of the public. The media also is known for supporting the government during wartime and during the 2003 Iraq War proved to be no different. Kumar argues that the control of information during this war was successful because of two factors: “the development and testing of government information control strategies over the last here decades and the emergence of a for-profit giant conglomerate media system that lends itself to propaganda due to its structural limitations.” Kumar also discusses how post-Vietnam military strategies and combined with the media consolidation goals creates a system that provides propaganda. It is now known that Bush and his administration were not truthful in justifying the war in Iraq, which started with 9/11. After the incident, the argument to enter Iraq consisted of two main elements which were that I raw was connected with 9/11 and that the country had weapons of mass destruction. These arguments were not only relayed by the government, but corporate media as well, which Kumar names an “axis of deception.” A majority of the media coverage were headlines on newspapers and the television. A key tactic of the media was omission, which promotes the ideals of the media conglomeration because the media system normally takes on a “watchdog” role. Another major role in propaganda was the spread of wrong information, which eventually would be retracted later by military officials and replaced with correct information, which created a distrusting public. This relationship between the media and the military was stressed due the desire to maintain credibility within the public sphere while protecting all of the interests of involved parties.
“Japanese Devils and American Wolves: Chinese Communist Songs form the War of Liberation and the Korean War” – Adam Cathcart
This article discusses how songs were used by the Chinese during the Korean war to promote anti-American ideas and establish Americans as an enemy by comparing them to the Japanese enemies in the past. By using song, a nation is able to forge unity, build loyalty, and depict enemies as evil. The Chinese propaganda songs sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party exploded during the Korean War and Cathcart explains how the songs were a major part of national identity and an example of how music can bring back old emotions to be used against a new enemy. The Chinese Communist Party used concepts from Confucius, Martin Luther, and Thomas Muntzer to have an effect on behavior, morals, and to instill revolution within people. During World War II, the Chinese depicted Americans in propaganda cartoons and songs as “ugly drunken, and lecherous Americans with jazz and dance halls” to combat American cultural imperialism. China also feared Japan after World War II and was afraid that the American occupation was helping their enemy. This fear was depicted in song lyrics and compared the Japanese to tigers and Americans to wolves in order to evoke vulgar aspects of the enemies. Eventually, Western ideals and arts were destroyed in China and replaced with Russian and Marxist values and entertainment. With this turn in culture, the songs produced were printed in newspapers, aired on the radio, played in classrooms, and incorporated into the daily lives of all citizens. By using these songs, Mao Zedong was able to strengthen the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party and create symbols that increased national identity. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Chinese children were taught songs that educated them on the crimes that Japan committed in the past and compared the Japanese to devils. The songs also included lyrics about America and the occupation in Japan, and that the U.S. was disturbing the peace in Korea.
The songs represent an enemy as animistic which makes the enemy heartless and unappeasable. Another strategy is that songs bring back public memory to bring the past emotions and details in order to create action against the new enemy and the current situation. Overall, the songs were successful in emphasizing a new national identity and reinforcing patriotism while demonizing the enemy.
White House Publicity Operations During the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951” – Steven Casey
This article focuses on the how the United States and Truman communicated during the Korean War. The beginning discusses Truman’s reputation with the public and how he “sold” the Cold War and the Korean War. Due to the fact the the Korean War was a limited war so Truman had restrictions placed on him to control what he could say or do in the eye of the public. The limited war has a great influence on how a President responds to the public and the conflict and essentially has a negative on the presidency as a whole. Truman dealt with the Korean War in a quieter manner when compared to the Cold War. For instance, Truman wanted to reserve certain wartime strategies just in case another world war began or the conflict in Korea became out of hand. For example, Truman refused to use the word “war” when describing the conflict in Korea in order to keep the term on standby if the conflict were to escalate. Truman was also reluctant in creating a propaganda agency for the similar reasons. The Office of War Information was also weighed as an option to help control the dissemination of information, but people and Congress distrust any form of propaganda. This causes the White House to rely on existing protocol and procedures and to improve upon them. Later, in an effort to control the information circulated about the war, Truman issued a “gag order” which restricted direct communication on the military and foreign policy with any media in the U. S. and ordered all government statements to be approved by the senior officials in Washington. This led to confusion within the public about the U.S.’s involvement in Korea and deterred any information about what was happening on the battlefield, no matter what the outcomes were.
"The Marketing of National Policies: A Study of War Propaganda" – Edward L. Bernays
This essay discusses how Germany, England, and the United States marketed their policies during World War One in an effort to make suggestions on how to successfully disseminate information regarding ideals and policies to the public in the future. Bernays believes that the best approach is one of scientific style and systematic in nature. To begin his argument, Bernays cites two works, the first, “Propaganda Technique in the World War” by Harold Lasswell, provides “six factors of propaganda.” The factors are as follows: (1) put the guilt of the war on the enemy, (2) “claim unity and victory in the names of history and deity,” (3) state the goals of war, such as security or a better social order, (4) make the people believe that the enemy is responsible for the war with evidence of the corruption, (5) make the people believe that negative news is really enemy lies, and (6) use horror stories to sound authoritative. The second work, “Allied Propaganda on the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918” by George Bruntz, lists five different types of propaganda: propaganda of enlightenment, propaganda of despair, propaganda of hope, particularist propaganda, and revolutionary propaganda. By breaking down what propaganda is, Bernays begins to focus on the purpose of propaganda and states that all propaganda, no matter what country, serves to increase morale on the home front, decrease the morale of the enemy, and win the morale of the neutral people.
The essay goes on to critique the propaganda and psychological warfare techniques of Germany, Great Britain, and America during World War One. Germany did not place value on influencing the morale on the home front and mainly focused on external techniques such as distributing leaflets and pamphlets to foreign countries. However, the propaganda distributed was overall poor and was thoughtless and too obvious. Britain on the other hand had control of trans-Atlantic cables and the radio, but still made use of planes to drop propaganda in enemy countries. The British propaganda was more successful than the German, one reason being that the British propaganda was organized by the citizens. Over in America, propaganda began because there became a need for it. The Committee on Public Information was founded in 1917 which worked without definite goals or a strategy to disseminate the information. Even with these limitations, the American propaganda proved to be effective. Bernays discusses what calls an “engineering approach” to propaganda and psychological warfare which calls for strategy, planning, and timing. This approach will allow all of the logistics behind propaganda, such as what the goal is, what symbols to use, how to communicate the messages, and how much money and materials would be necessary, to be carefully planned out. Bernays also suggested that a general staff of experts be formed for the purpose of psychological warfare so that when needed, the staff would speed the process of morale building and creating propaganda to strengthen America’s democracy.
“The Strategies of Psychological Warfare” – Leonard W. Doob
In this article, Doob suggests that strategies of psychological warfare can be catalogued and examined regardless of the many variables, making them “a little less artistic and a little more scientific.” The major goal of Doob is to identify the factors in psychological warfare and figuring out how these factors can be weighted to make a sort of psychological warfare equation. By isolating the variables of psychological warfare, planning strategies would be more concrete and would be recommended rather than just being selected.
The first variable that is examined is the response of the audience to the psychological warfare, which is broken down into three categories that act as independent variables: responses that were wanted, responses that already existed, and anticipated future responses. From these variables, Doob discusses possible routes that each variable creates, which eventually lead to assumptions about how successful the logistics of psychological warfare tactics are. These assumptions are organized into a chart and can be used to determine a strategy for psychological warfare. Another aspect of psychological warfare campaigns is the enemy. The tactics used are meant to weaken the enemy. Doob created a second chart to show ten randomly selected campaigns against the enemy and shows the foundations of the strategies. The chart makes the psychological warfare planner be more mindful of the variables related to the strategy.
“Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II” – Martin F. Herz
Herz discusses the leaflet and combat propaganda and their role in World War II. Though it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the materials because the audience is unavailable, general guidelines to create propaganda can be made. Herz says that the materials must be truthful, the person creating the propaganda must know how to address people who are unsure of either side’s messages within the enemy, the attack must be concentrated, domestic propaganda should not be exported, an area of agreement must be reached with the audience, and the creator must decide what strategies would be successful for both sides. In order to determine the effectiveness of the campaigns the following evidence was utilized: the number of leaflets found with the prisoners, the recollection of the leaflets the prisoners had and their comments about them, positive mentions, the descriptions of the surrenders by the prisoners, German counter-propaganda, and comments from the enemy command that were found from captured documents. Herz also introduces that combat propaganda must target “the marginal man” because he can be swayed and could be useful for peacetime propaganda. Finding common ground with the enemy using propaganda is important for the psychological manipulation of the enemy. “Black propaganda” or “gray propaganda,” propaganda, in which the source is not known, is a dangerous strategy because if the source is found out, then increased hatred occurs. Taking into account all of these aspects of propaganda, the success of the campaign can be more effective against the enemy.
“The Future of Psychological Warfare”- Hans Speier
Speier discusses multiple examples of warfare propaganda to use as evidence that more study and preparation are necessary for the United States to implement successful psychological warfare campaigns in the future. Speier also suggests that in order to be prepared, the U.S. must become realistic about political warfare and that more development and preparation of psychological warfare tactics must take place. In both World Wars, psychological warfare was unprepared and left up to people who had experience in advertising, news, and entertainment, and Speier notes that in the event of another war, this poor planning will not be as successful as it was in the past. The United States lacks an organization to plan for these strategies and there is no accurate study on how to measure the effectiveness of propaganda. Another factor that the U.S. lacks is that there is no peacetime planning for wartime propaganda. During war, the focus was placed on releasing the news of the week and there was not any planning beyond this task. In the future, Americans need to be protected and defensive measures need to be taken to keep their morale. Speier suggests that “the historical form of propaganda is a trait of the civilization in which it occurs,” which is seen in wartime propaganda as it relies on the amount of mass participation in war, the tension between the countries, and on the political systems and ideologies. One of the only times during war when morals are brought up is when psychological warfare is considered. Efforts to render the enemy vulnerable in unity and instill a feeling of defeatism are both important attributes of psychological warfare. The enemy is also defined as a “total enemy” who is impossible to settle a conflict with, so that when the all psychological warfare strategies can be used at the most opportune moment so that success is guaranteed.
Tactical propaganda and strategic propaganda are compared, noting that the difference is tactical can provide a reward, such as safety, and strategic can only provide increased combat and suffering. Strategic propaganda has the goal of subversion, action against one’s government. This propaganda must create motivation and inspire belief in ideas that are worth a sacrifice. Speier goes on to discuss “missionary subversion propaganda,” “Cynical subversion propaganda,” and “moralistic and judicious subversion propaganda,” all of which are similar but have slightly different strategies such as convincing the enemy that there is no hope or that it is their moral duty to act in a certain manner.
“Pamphlets Away: The Allied Propaganda Campaign Over Japan During the Last Months of World War II” – Ferenc Morton Szasz
The essay begins by discussing the many ways psychological operations were executed in World War II to raise morale in the home front and discourage the enemy. These tactics included pamphlets, films, leaflets, and booklets. In Germany, the fil Sieg im Westen celebrated the victories of the Nazis, America also made use of films, and Britain dropped leaflets. Leaflets were a main form of propaganda and were used for six years. The success of these leaflets, however, is disputed among historians. Some suggest in the case of Nazi propaganda that eventually it all blurred together while others say it formed another aspect of the war and that the Nazis “won” this aspect. Another aspect of the argument is that there has been little study on the impact of leaflets and therefore negating the rest of the arguments. Over in the Pacific, the psychological operations relied on mostly short-wave radio broadcasts and leaflets dropped from a plane. These leaflet missions were disliked by military personnel due to the high risk nature and for the purpose of just dropping paper. However, the attitude towards the missions later changed when the process was streamlined as a result of the “leaflet bomb” created by Army Air Corps Captain James Monroe.
The United States dropped millions of leaflets over Japan in efforts to warn civilians and attempt to persuade the Japanese troops to surrender and cease resistance. Surprisingly, about ten thousand Japanese soldiers took the offer of safe passage on the leaflets at Okinawa which led to the capture of the city. From this, the POWs were used to translate new leaflets and a portable printing press was set up. In response the the American propaganda attack, the Japanese government became strict with communication systems in an attempt to decrease American messages. In all of the leaflets released over Japan, none mentioned the possible threat of an atomic weapon. This was due to the secrecy of the project and a desire to create shock within the Japanese people with a surprise attack. However, before the attack, in an attempt to avoid excess deaths, the U.S. dropped leaflets warning of an air raid and told people to seek shelter. This strategy was groundbreaking as it was the first time in history that an enemy was told ahead of time when attack would occur. Historians note that while radio was important to change Japanese views, the leaflets that were dropped were more effective and held more weight with the people. This effectiveness stemmed from the sheer volume of leaflets dropped and the repeated messages of warnings to evacuate and to build a peaceful life after the war, these two elements gave the leaflets credibility that really affected the Japanese.
“Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War” – Deepa Kumar
Kumar discusses how the media-military industrial complex is used to make sure that pro-war messages are constantly in the public sphere. Due to media consolidation, the media acts in the interests of the prominent people of the political and economic spheres rather than in the interest of the public. The media also is known for supporting the government during wartime and during the 2003 Iraq War proved to be no different. Kumar argues that the control of information during this war was successful because of two factors: “the development and testing of government information control strategies over the last here decades and the emergence of a for-profit giant conglomerate media system that lends itself to propaganda due to its structural limitations.” Kumar also discusses how post-Vietnam military strategies and combined with the media consolidation goals creates a system that provides propaganda. It is now known that Bush and his administration were not truthful in justifying the war in Iraq, which started with 9/11. After the incident, the argument to enter Iraq consisted of two main elements which were that I raw was connected with 9/11 and that the country had weapons of mass destruction. These arguments were not only relayed by the government, but corporate media as well, which Kumar names an “axis of deception.” A majority of the media coverage were headlines on newspapers and the television. A key tactic of the media was omission, which promotes the ideals of the media conglomeration because the media system normally takes on a “watchdog” role. Another major role in propaganda was the spread of wrong information, which eventually would be retracted later by military officials and replaced with correct information, which created a distrusting public. This relationship between the media and the military was stressed due the desire to maintain credibility within the public sphere while protecting all of the interests of involved parties.
“Japanese Devils and American Wolves: Chinese Communist Songs form the War of Liberation and the Korean War” – Adam Cathcart
This article discusses how songs were used by the Chinese during the Korean war to promote anti-American ideas and establish Americans as an enemy by comparing them to the Japanese enemies in the past. By using song, a nation is able to forge unity, build loyalty, and depict enemies as evil. The Chinese propaganda songs sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party exploded during the Korean War and Cathcart explains how the songs were a major part of national identity and an example of how music can bring back old emotions to be used against a new enemy. The Chinese Communist Party used concepts from Confucius, Martin Luther, and Thomas Muntzer to have an effect on behavior, morals, and to instill revolution within people. During World War II, the Chinese depicted Americans in propaganda cartoons and songs as “ugly drunken, and lecherous Americans with jazz and dance halls” to combat American cultural imperialism. China also feared Japan after World War II and was afraid that the American occupation was helping their enemy. This fear was depicted in song lyrics and compared the Japanese to tigers and Americans to wolves in order to evoke vulgar aspects of the enemies. Eventually, Western ideals and arts were destroyed in China and replaced with Russian and Marxist values and entertainment. With this turn in culture, the songs produced were printed in newspapers, aired on the radio, played in classrooms, and incorporated into the daily lives of all citizens. By using these songs, Mao Zedong was able to strengthen the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party and create symbols that increased national identity. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Chinese children were taught songs that educated them on the crimes that Japan committed in the past and compared the Japanese to devils. The songs also included lyrics about America and the occupation in Japan, and that the U.S. was disturbing the peace in Korea.
The songs represent an enemy as animistic which makes the enemy heartless and unappeasable. Another strategy is that songs bring back public memory to bring the past emotions and details in order to create action against the new enemy and the current situation. Overall, the songs were successful in emphasizing a new national identity and reinforcing patriotism while demonizing the enemy.
White House Publicity Operations During the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951” – Steven Casey
This article focuses on the how the United States and Truman communicated during the Korean War. The beginning discusses Truman’s reputation with the public and how he “sold” the Cold War and the Korean War. Due to the fact the the Korean War was a limited war so Truman had restrictions placed on him to control what he could say or do in the eye of the public. The limited war has a great influence on how a President responds to the public and the conflict and essentially has a negative on the presidency as a whole. Truman dealt with the Korean War in a quieter manner when compared to the Cold War. For instance, Truman wanted to reserve certain wartime strategies just in case another world war began or the conflict in Korea became out of hand. For example, Truman refused to use the word “war” when describing the conflict in Korea in order to keep the term on standby if the conflict were to escalate. Truman was also reluctant in creating a propaganda agency for the similar reasons. The Office of War Information was also weighed as an option to help control the dissemination of information, but people and Congress distrust any form of propaganda. This causes the White House to rely on existing protocol and procedures and to improve upon them. Later, in an effort to control the information circulated about the war, Truman issued a “gag order” which restricted direct communication on the military and foreign policy with any media in the U. S. and ordered all government statements to be approved by the senior officials in Washington. This led to confusion within the public about the U.S.’s involvement in Korea and deterred any information about what was happening on the battlefield, no matter what the outcomes were.
Works Cited
Bernays, Edward L. "The Marketing Of National Policies: A Study Of War Propaganda." Journal
Of Marketing 6.3 (1942): 236-244. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Casey, Steven. "White House Publicity Operations During The Korean War, June 1950–June 1951." Presidential Studies Quarterly 35.4 (2005): 691-717.Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Cathcart, Adam. "Japanese Devils And American Wolves: Chinese Communist Songs From The War Of Liberation And The Korean War." Popular Music & Society 33.2 (2010): 203- 218. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Doob, Leonard W. "The Strategies Of Psychological Warfare." Public Opinion Quarterly 13.4 (1949): 635-644. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Herz, Martin F. "Some Psychological Lessons From Leaflet Propaganda In World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly 13.3 (1949): 471-486. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Kumar, Deepa. "Media, War, And Propaganda: Strategies Of Information Management During The 2003 Iraq War." Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 3.1 (2006): 48- 69. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Speier, Hans. "The Future Of Psychological Warfare." Public Opinion Quarterly 12.1 (1948): 5- 18. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. Szasz, Ferenc Morton. "“Pamphlets Away”: The Allied Propaganda Campaign Over Japan During The Last Months Of World War II." Journal Of Popular Culture 42.3 (2009): 530- 540. Communication & Mass Media Complete. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. |